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Pluralistic conditioning:

social tolerance and effective democracy

Kris Dunn a & Shane P. Singh b

a College of Social Sciences and International Studies, University of Exeter, UK

b Department of International Affairs, University of Georgia, Atlanta, USA

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Modern democracy is based in dissent and diversity. The essential defining aspect of democracy is the existence of competitive and fair elections; an element which emphasizes diversity of opinion and serves to place one party (or group of parties) in power, while relegating the other(s) to dissent. The diversity inherent to democratic systems instills in a country’s inhabitants an awareness of difference, which in turn propagates more tolerant individuals. In autocratic regimes, expression of diversity is restrained, being considered the basis of disorder and thereby detrimental to the state. In liberal democratic societies, freedom of expression and speech and a free media are widely accepted principles. Political parties and social groups in liberal democratic societies are therefore able to express varied and opposing opinions on societal concerns, and such opinions are broadcast to large swaths of the population. Exposure to such variety indicates to even the most inattentive of individuals that they reside in a diverse and heterogeneous society. For many individuals, exposure to diversity promotes tolerance of difference. While diversity tends to breed tolerance, there is a critical exception to this generality. Exposure to diversity only facilitates tolerance of difference when such exposure occurs under positive or neutral conditions. Those who are exposed to diversity under aversive conditions are instead pushed toward intolerance of difference. Our thesis in this article is thus one of pluralistic conditioning.

In general, when individuals are exposed to diversity under positive or neutral conditions, they become more tolerant of diversity. However, when individuals are exposed to diversity under aversive conditions, they become less tolerant of diversity. This thesis unites findings from multiple disciplines under a single theoretical framework.

Keywords: democracy; elections; freedom of expression; liberal democracy; pluralistic conditioning

This article diverges from previous research relating democracy with tolerance in four key aspects. First, we provide a unified framework from which to view findings from numerous disciplines and research areas. Second, we propose a theory
which takes an affective, rather than a cognitive, perspective. Third, complementing our affective perspective, we examine generalized social tolerance rather than political tolerance. Finally, we examine both the positive and the negative side of this thesis, whether exposure to diversity under general conditions promotes tolerance and whether under negative conditions facilitates intolerance toward outgroups. Examining the negative side of this thesis is clearly a problematic issue as one must point to a single and consistent element that occurs across a large range of countries and that creates an aversive environment under which exposure to the diversity inherent to democracy occurs. Fortunately, the literature on individual authoritarianism provides one such element, an authoritarian predisposition.

Authoritarians, those possessing an authoritarian predisposition, are individuals defined by their inherent aversion to diversity. Individuals with an authoritarian predisposition are unavoidably exposed to diversity under aversive conditions as diversity itself is aversive to these individuals. Authoritarians, unlike their fellow citizens, should become notably more intolerant when exposed to increased levels of effective, that is, more liberal, democracy; authoritarians’ reaction to increased effective democracy will test whether exposure to the diversity inherent in liberal democracy under aversive conditions results in decreased tolerance relative to the population.

Guided by the pluralistic conditioning thesis, this article empirically examines the relationship between effective democracy and individual tolerance toward outgroups. Using the World Values Survey and the European Values Study (WVS/EVS), we test whether higher levels of effective democracy correspond with an increase in tolerance among individuals in general, and a decrease in tolerance among authoritarians. Multilevel conditional models provide support for our thesis: in general, higher levels of effective democracy correspond with higher levels of tolerance toward outgroups; among authoritarians, higher levels of effective democracy correspond with an increase in tolerance toward outgroups, relative to the sample as a whole.

**Democracy and diversity**

Our primary goal in this research is to dissect the relationship between democracy and tolerance, with a specific focus toward introducing an affective explanation for the relationship between liberal democracy and individual tolerance. Thus, we begin by examining the degree to which liberal democracy propagates the expression of diversity. We then discuss the psychological mechanisms that lead democracy to foster tolerance and intolerance among different segments of the population.

In the seventeenth century, the traditional wisdom of governance began to corrode; the belief that diversity embodied discord and disorder and that unanimity was necessary for a successful state faded. This wisdom was replaced by a general acceptance of diversity and an increasing suspicion of pure consensus. This
alteration in political dogma led to the development of liberal democratic institutions, and, piece by piece, to societies governed by modern liberal democratic regimes.¹

Modernization theory suggests that the shift away from traditional notions of unanimity and toward support for diversity derives from a shift in societal values that accompany increased economic security. The current incarnation of modernization theory stems from the idea that a shift in values corresponds to generational replacement of the populace.² As younger generations who come of age in an economically secure environment replace those raised in an era of uncertainty and insecurity, societal values become more secular-rational and self-expressive, as opposed to traditional and survival oriented.³ This shift in values results in a diverse society that increasingly demands a more responsive and democratically inclusive political system.

Movement along the path from autocratic to liberal democratic regimes is a step toward allowing the diversity inherent in modernized societies to manifest. Liberal democratic institutions derive from a pluralistic society; from a society of cross-cutting cleavages tied to the principle of concordia discors, dissenting consensus.⁴ Liberal democratic principles such as freedom of speech and freedom of expression are, in the abstract, supported by an overwhelming majority in any democratic society.⁵ The concrete application of these abstract principles along with a free media grants the opportunity for the diversity inherent in a society to be revealed for all to see.

Democracy and liberalism, however, are not inexorably linked. As the democratic transitions literature demonstrates, there is reason for concern regarding how effective newly emerging democracies truly are in promoting pluralism and tolerance, especially since the third wave of democratization in the 1990s.⁶ The divergence of democratic institutions from liberal democratic principles manifests in a distinction between purely formal, procedural democracy and effective, substantive democracy.⁷ Formal democracy has little meaning if political rights and civil liberties are withheld or obstructed by a tyrannical majority or a corrupt elite. As Heller argues:

An effective democracy has two interrelated characteristics – a robust civil society and a capable state. A free and lively civil society makes the state and its agents more accountable by guaranteeing that consultation takes place not just through electoral representation (periodic mandates) but also through constant feedback and negotiation . . .

The capacity of the state is also central to the effectiveness of democracy. Procedural guarantees of civic and political rights, including rights of association and free speech, do not automatically translate into the effective exercise of democratic rights . . . Individuals and groups must be protected from arbitrary state action but also from forms of social authority that might constrain or impinge upon their civic and political liberties. And creating public spaces that are protected from non-democratic forms of authority requires far more than writing constitutions and holding officials accountable.⁸
Considering the distinction between formal and effective democracy expands the conceptual framework of democracy from a categorical, yes or no, distinction, into a continuum from a pure autocracy to a fully effective democracy which fully incarnates liberal democratic principles into concrete practice. As liberal democratic principles embody the pluralistic ideals of dissent and diversity, this continuum from autocracy to a fully effective democracy, in turn, corresponds with a continuum ranging from complete suppression to full expression of diversity.

**Pluralistic conditioning**

The proposed pathway from liberal democracy to tolerance flows from the manifestation of diversity, to the propagation of exposure to diversity, and then to tolerance of diversity. Individuals in societies where diversity is manifest are exposed to diversity via both intergroup contact and the media. Exposure to diversity in the absence of aversive conditions inculcates, in a largely unconscious fashion, a positive perception of diversity. As such, individuals become more tolerant toward outgroups; people become conditioned to accept difference as a normal and unthreatening facet of society. We refer to this phenomenon as pluralistic conditioning.

Pluralistic conditioning is a specific application of the *mere exposure effect*. The mere exposure thesis states that attitudes toward a neutral stimulus become more positive with repeated exposure, and awareness of this exposure is not necessary. Simply having a stimulus within perceptive range is sufficient to improve people’s attitudes toward it. Essentially, the mere exposure effect ‘can be regarded as a form of classical conditioning if we assume that the absence of aversive events constitutes the unconditioned stimulus’ and thereby ‘provides a flexible means of forming selective attachments and affective dispositions, with remarkably minimal investment of energy, even when exposures are not accessible to awareness’.

The mere exposure effect creates affective attachment rather than cognitive attachment; mere exposure accounts for object attachment without cognitive processing of information. The independence of attitude change from cognition has been found in numerous studies. Cacioppo and Petty, for example, demonstrate that recall of issue content is not necessary for attitude change; although being able to recall the content of an issue does lead to stronger attitudes than non-recall. Even a single exposure to a stimulus can result in attitude change lasting up to a year, while repeated exposure lengthens this duration. Mere exposure theory suggests that exposure to diversity in the absence of aversive conditions will lead to generally positive attitudes toward diversity itself.

Pluralistic conditioning is exemplified in Intergroup Contact Theory. Going beyond the simplistic ‘familiarity breeds liking’ thesis, which was effectively dismissed in the 1970s, a number of theories have focused on the circumstances of contact in determining whether contact leads to negative, neutral, or positive
affect toward a target group. Intergroup Contact Theory as revised by Pettigrew specifies that reduction in prejudice occurs only under conditions which result in acquaintance or friendship potential. These conditions, summarized efficiently by Pettigrew, all share the quality of being neutral or positive environments and interactions.

Alternatively, forced or necessary interaction, as opposed to voluntary interaction, may have little if any effect on attitudes, and exposure under conditions of high intergroup anxiety and threat may hinder or reverse the otherwise positive effects of contact. Essentially, durational positive orientations only develop in the absence of aversive conditions. And, as with the positive effect of mere exposure on tolerance of diversity in general, studies on affective prejudice find the beneficial effects of non-aversive exposure to a single outgroup (that is, a reduction in anti-outgroup sentiment) also produces a general beneficial effect on prejudice toward all outgroups. Further, this line of study emphasizes that this positive orientation toward outgroups due to exposure is primarily a function of affect (reduced anxiety) rather than cognition (increased knowledge).

Research also indicates that exposure to diversity does not need to be direct. Information is also a valid stimulus. As with information in general, information that relays a perception of diversity can travel through a number of media. The most extensive media network is, of course, the mass media of a society. A long research tradition notes the impact of mass media on attitude change. Entman notes that ‘the mere presence of conflicting views in the news may convey an awareness of the diversity of the country, including its variety of races, economic classes, and viewpoints’ and ‘[s]uch consciousness may promote tolerance of change, and empathy for positions or groups that challenge the status quo’. Such diversity in news coverage can be inspired by political institutions themselves and can serve to inculcate more tolerant attitudes toward a variety of outgroups among the general public. Simply put, exposure to information that portrays a diverse society, whether that information takes the form of a physical encounter with a member of an outgroup or hearing a news report regarding a debate in parliament, serves to instill tolerant attitudes, if such exposure is under non-aversive conditions.

Importantly, the pluralistic conditioning thesis also predicts the spread of intolerance; when exposed to diversity in the presence of aversive conditions, an individual will become less tolerant of diversity in society. In this sense, pluralistic conditioning can be thought of as a neutral descriptor with a positive and negative application dependent on socio-political circumstances. However, for ease of use, we equate the term pluralistic conditioning with the positive use of the term; when referring to the negative application and associating pluralistic conditioning with intolerance, we use the terminology aversive pluralistic conditioning.

Democratic diversity and intolerance
That exposure to diversity under aversive conditions can have a deleterious effect on tolerance is supported by ethnic competition theory and realistic group conflict
theory. Ethnic competition theory focuses on cultural threat, and argues that intolerance is engendered when a sizeable outgroup is perceived to pose a threat to the cultural status quo, introducing competition over customs, values and identity.\textsuperscript{23} Realistic group conflict theory argues from an economic perspective, proposing that intergroup conflict and anti-outgroup sentiment result from intergroup competition over limited resources.\textsuperscript{24} Both of these theories argue that threat results in increased intolerance toward outgroups.

A more general and universally applicable demonstration of aversive pluralistic intolerance is provided by theory and research from the individual authoritarianism literature. Stenner argues that due to cognitive and psychological development, authoritarians find diversity aversive.\textsuperscript{25} For authoritarians, diversity itself creates an aversive environment and will exacerbate intolerance toward outgroups.

Stenner, in order to account for conditional effects associated with threat perception,\textsuperscript{26} develops and employs an interactive model of authoritarianism she refers to as the authoritarian dynamic.\textsuperscript{27} Stenner argues that as a result of a cognitive incapacity to deal with diversity, authoritarians possess an inherent aversion to heterogeneity and a preference for uniformity and group cohesion. In a particularly telling experiment, she finds that authoritarians interviewed by an outgroup member (black Americans in this case) demonstrate substantially higher levels of intolerance than those interviewed by members of the ingroup (white Americans).

For authoritarians diversity and dissent are aversive conditions. Authoritarians are thereby automatically exposed to diversity under aversive conditions; for authoritarians, exposure to diversity and dissent is also exposure to normative threat and is thereby psychologically aversive. As authoritarians are fundamentally predisposed to perceive diversity aversively, they are an ideal group with which to demonstrate how pluralism can lead to intolerance under aversive conditions. Aversive pluralistic conditioning predicts that authoritarians who are exposed to the diversity and dissent inherent to liberal democracy will become more intolerant of those they see as different.

The central question of this research regards the relationship between democracy and tolerance. Our theory provides two hypotheses: first, in general, \textit{(H1) the diversity and dissent inherent to democracy will provide for a more tolerant individual (pluralistic conditioning)}; second, \textit{(H2) the diversity and dissent inherent to democracy will exacerbate the relationship between authoritarianism and intolerance (aversive pluralistic conditioning)}.

\textbf{Data and concept measurement}

Our individual-level data comes from the 1995–1997, 1999–2000 and 2005 waves of the WVS and the corresponding 1999–2000 wave of the EVS. Though some countries are surveyed in more than one wave, we include only the most recent survey year in such cases. Data is available on each variable across 75 countries\textsuperscript{28} and 75,478 individuals. There is an average of 1006
individuals per country in the sample, with a low of 326 and a high of 2418. ‘Don’t know’ answers are coded as missing, and all observations with missing data are excluded listwise.

Social tolerance

When attempting to isolate how tolerance and context are related, one must possess a context-neutral measure. Without this, one cannot determine whether the relationship is biased due to an improper tolerance measure. Previous studies of tolerance, especially those related to political tolerance, are (intentionally) heavily context dependent and fail to meet this basic requirement.

The items often used in political tolerance studies are problematic because they reference specific groups and specific acts. One of the notable claims of Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus is that Americans are not becoming more tolerant in general, as claimed by Nunn, Crockett and Williams, but are becoming more tolerant of certain groups. This is determined by identifying the least-liked group of the respondent and using that group to contextualize the tolerance items. However, as noted by Chong, the content-controlled strategy of Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus ‘falters because it summarizes the level of tolerance in a society on the basis of an extreme data point. Instead, we should examine the range or variety of groups in a society to which people are willing to extend basic civil liberties’. The assumptions of Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus as well as Nunn, Crockett and Williams are problematic in that they assume an individual who does not support the right for a certain group to hold a public rally, among other acts, is intolerant of that group. In reality, that individual may be against the specific act; such as a public rally. Further, there is a considerable difference between an individual who is intolerant of a single outgroup and one who is intolerant of any outgroup.

While such specific content-controlled and situational measures of tolerance are clearly necessary for theses related to the relationship between abstract democratic principles and more concrete expressions of those principles, for those interested solely in tolerance of outgroups such measures confound the issue. We therefore make use of a minimalist measure of social tolerance which avoids all such confusion by relying on questions that seek solely to determine if the respondent is willing to live in the vicinity of a member of a certain group.

Our primary dependent variable, social tolerance, is defined as a positive general orientation toward groups outside of one’s own. As such, we create a measure that captures respondents’ underlying dispositions towards those who are unlike themselves. The social tolerance measure is created from six questions drawn from the WVS/EVS, which are ideal for this study. Each question is a binary measure of rejection or acceptance of a distinct group as neighbours: people of a different race, immigrants/foreign workers, people with AIDS, homosexuals, drug users, and heavy drinkers. These groups are chosen to yield as wide a variety of groups as possible; as the definition of social tolerance references all outgroups, the larger number of groups included in the social tolerance scale allows an
individual to be a member of a certain group (within the scale) without invalidating the scale for that individual.

The scale’s Cronbach’s alpha value is 0.63 across all countries. The moderate alpha is not unexpected as these groups form distinctive categories. An exploratory factor analysis (using a polychoric correlation matrix) indicates that the social tolerance scale is composed of two separate, yet correlated, groups: the first being composed of people of a different race and immigrants/foreign workers and the second being composed of people with AIDS, homosexuals, drug users, and heavy drinkers. As the scale is intentionally inclusive of a variety of distinct social groups that are viewed with differing levels of acceptance depending on the country under consideration, we choose to retain the scale. A higher value on this scale indicates a higher level of social tolerance. The mean social tolerance value for each country in the dataset is depicted in Figure 1.

To further demonstrate robustness, we also present results for two separate social tolerance scales below – one focusing on race and immigration and the other composed of the questions related to AIDS, homosexuals, drug users and heavy drinkers. Further, analyses using each individual tolerance item as the dependent variable do not substantively change the conclusions reached from those reported using the scale.

**Effective democracy**

As noted above, there is a distinction between purely formal democracy and effective democracy. Definitions of formal democracy centre on the procedural or institutional organization of a country and classify a country as democratic if there is ‘free competition for a free vote’. Formal definitions of democracy are unconcerned with the substantive outcomes of the democratic process.

The concept of effective democracy is a ‘substantive definition’ of democracy and argues that formal democracy means little if institutionalized political rights and civil liberties are withheld or obstructed by a tyrannical majority or a corrupt elite. As our argument linking democracy and tolerance necessitates the free expression of diversity, we adopt the more substantive conceptualization of modern liberal democracy. Our measure of democracy therefore accounts for not only the presence of formal democracy in a country, but also for how effective countries are in their application of liberal democratic principles.

We construct our primary independent variable as a measure of ‘effective democracy’. This measure is based on the Freedom House scores for ‘civil liberties’ and ‘political rights’, which account for the institutionalization of liberal democratic principles, and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators’ ‘control of corruption’ scores, which account for the effective delivery of institutionalized liberal democracy. The ‘civil liberties’ and ‘political rights’ measures are inverted so that higher scores indicate more freedom, summed and rescaled to range from 0 to 10. The ‘control of corruption’ measure is rescaled to range from 0 to 1. These two measures are then multiplied to produce the effective democracy
Figure 1. Social tolerance across countries.
measure, ranging, in theory, from 0 to 10. For each country the measures correspond to the year the WVS/EVS survey began. The value of this variable for each country in the dataset is displayed in Figure 2.

**Authoritarian predisposition**

Feldman and Stenner propose a measurement strategy for authoritarianism that separates a predisposition to intolerance (that is, an authoritarian predisposition) from intolerant attitudes.\(^{36}\) This measure of an individual’s authoritarian predisposition is composed of questions inquiring into an individual’s child-rearing values. The authors argue that these questions unobtrusively, without evoking authoritarian attitudes, measure an individual’s predisposition to express authoritarian attitudes under conditions of normative threat; in their own words:

Although this is not a traditional measure of authoritarianism, it has long been noted that this dimension of child-rearing values is strongly related to other authoritarianism measures and to presumed consequences of authoritarianism ... From a lengthy empirical study of intolerance, Martin concludes: ‘There is probably no other question on which tolerants differ from intolerants more sharply than on child-rearing practices ... We believe that this dimension of child-rearing values provides an excellent, nonobtrusive measure of authoritarian predispositions.’ It is particularly useful for our purposes since it does not include questions tapping presumed consequences of authoritarianism – like prejudice and intolerance – that make up our set of independent variables.\(^{37}\)

Concurring with the logic of Feldman and Stenner, we follow Stenner, Dunn and Singh, and Singh and Dunn who utilize specific child-rearing values questions from the Values surveys to measure an individual’s authoritarian predisposition.\(^{38}\) The authoritarian predisposition scale is composed of four questions gauging the respondent’s view as to desirable qualities to instill in children: independence, imagination, and respect/tolerance for others, all reverse coded, and obedience.

Following Singh and Dunn, we argue that the authoritarian predisposition scale is a formative rather than a reflective scale and therefore do not report an alpha coefficient.\(^{39}\) Reflective measurement signifies that the component variables in the scale are interchangeable with one another and that the error variance associated with each indicator of the latent concept is independent. Formally:

\[
x_j = \lambda_j \eta + \varepsilon_j
\]

where \(x_j\) is the \(j\)th indicator of the latent variable \(\eta\), \(\lambda_j\) is the coefficient capturing the effect of \(\eta\) on \(x_j\), and \(\varepsilon_j\) is the measurement error for the \(j\)th indicator. The purpose of combining multiple indicators of a single concept is to cancel out as much error as possible, thereby leaving a more precise measure of the concept. Scale reliability is meant to address this theory of measurement, with
Figure 2. Effective democracy across countries.
a higher reliability indicating a higher level of shared variance among the component items.

As conceptualized by Stenner, authoritarianism is ‘an individual predisposition concerned with the appropriate balance between group authority and uniformity, on the one hand, and individual autonomy and diversity, on the other’.40 Authoritarianism is defined by reference to convergent and competing values and cannot be gauged by reference to a single value or a single polar value dimension. To measure an authoritarian predisposition, it is necessary to account for multiple convergent and competing values, as is noted in the definition above. A reflective scale would require, for example, that a low score on the obedience question should indicate a high score on the independence or imagination or tolerance and respect questions. However, any given respondent can justifiably score all of those values equally highly, especially when not required to rank order them and when the survey instrument blunts the response option to yes/no as it does in the WVS/EVS.41

An authoritarian predisposition (the latent construct) is determined here via the combination of its constituent indicators rather than the indicators being determined by authoritarianism and therefore requires formative measurement. This measurement strategy does not require correlated items as the following formula indicates:

$$\eta = \sum_{j=1}^{m} (\gamma_j x_j) + \zeta$$

where $\gamma_j$ is a coefficient capturing the effect of indicator $x_j$ on the latent variable $\eta$, and $\zeta$ is a disturbance term. The constituent items in formative measurement are not considered to possess their own measurement error and therefore the goal of formative measurement is not to decrease the measurement error of these items. Instead, the latent variable possesses its own construct-level error (that is, that portion of the construct not provided for by the formative indicators) reflected in the disturbance term. The goal in formative measurement is to create a construct that is not reflected in any of the formative indicators.

The items used to construct this scale are formative to the concept of authoritarianism rather than reflective of it. If we remove certain items, the others will not necessarily compensate for their loss and the scale will lose its ability to measure the concept.42 As the items contribute to a face valid construct and the scale correlates with relevant other variables in the dataset in a predictable fashion, we are confident in proceeding with this scale.

Though we often refer to authoritarians as a distinct group, this is more for conceptual clarity than accuracy. It is important to keep in mind that authoritarianism is a scale with no solid cutpoints (outside of those that numerical scales generate due to measurement issues). It is more accurate to state that some are more or less authoritarian than others. Those traits associated with authoritarians
are likely found in all of us, just not to the same degree and/or under the same circumstances.

**Control variables**

We include age, education, gender, ideology and religiosity as individual-level control variables and modernization and social heterogeneity as country-level control variables, all of which are generally associated with tolerance. We briefly discuss the rationale, expectations and measurement for these variables below.

**Age:** As discussed by Inglehart and others, older cohorts tend to be less tolerant.\(^4^3\) We thus include a variable for age, coded in years.

**Education:** Social tolerance and education are generally held to be positively related.\(^4^4\) As the education variable from the WVS was coded slightly differently between the 1999 and 2005 surveys and as the arbitrary rank ordering of technical education below university-preparatory education seems unwarranted, we have recoded the education variable into six categories: no or incomplete primary (elementary) education, complete primary education, incomplete secondary school (technical or university-preparatory), complete secondary school (technical or university-preparatory), university education without degree, and university education with degree. Higher values indicate a higher level of education.

**Gender:** Previous research demonstrates that females tend toward more egalitarian social policies than men and are thereby likely to hold more tolerant social attitudes.\(^4^5\) We control for gender using a categorical variable, with females coded 0 and males coded 1.

**Ideology:** A person’s Left–Right (or liberal-conservative in the US) identification is often found to be related to tolerance, with those identifying with the Left more tolerant than those who identify with the Right.\(^4^6\) Ideology is a self-reported measure of Left–Right identification, with higher values indicating right-wing tendency.

**Religiosity:** Religiosity is shown to have a negative relationship with social tolerance in numerous studies, often irrespective of particular religions or denominations.\(^4^7\) To gauge religiosity, we create a scale based on four questions. The questions inquire as to the importance of religion in one’s life, the frequency of attendance of religious service, one’s self-described religiosity, and the importance of God in one’s life. The scale yields a reliability coefficient of 0.83.

**Per capita gross domestic product (GDP):** Inglehart and Welzel argue that the sustained economic growth associated with modern societies is the driving force behind the formation of self-expression values, of which tolerance is a part.\(^4^8\) To measure economic development, we use the common indicator of per capita GDP, adjusted for purchasing power, standardized to constant US dollars in thousands, and logged. This variable is taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators for each country and corresponds to the year in which the WVS/EVS wave began.
Social heterogeneity: Social fractionalization, while fostering tolerant attitudes, is also a necessary condition for societal conflict between groups. As Hodson, Sekulic and Massey note, ‘[h]eterogeneity provides the conditions fostering increased tolerance among individuals of diverse nationality through increased contact, but it also creates the conditions under which different national groups engage in competition over scarce resources’. Thus, we control for social heterogeneity with no a priori assumption regarding how it will affect social tolerance. To measure social heterogeneity we use the popular ethnic fractionalization index developed by Alesina et al., in which higher values indicate more diversity. For each country, the measure again corresponds to the year in which the WVS/EVS wave began.

Each variable is summarized across the dataset in Table 1.

Methods and results

Our initial hypothesis is that tolerance should increase with the level of democracy. Figure 3 illustrates this bivariate relationship across the 75 countries in our sample at the aggregate level. The local regression line in the plot indicates that there is a positive and near-linear relationship between these two variables. The correlation is 0.619.

This initial examination provides some evidence for our expectation that democracy and tolerance are positively linked. However, our theoretical mechanisms operate at the individual level. In our sample, the data is observed at two levels, as individuals (level-1) are grouped within countries (level-2). A multilevel model is well suited to our theory, which dictates a relationship between a country-level independent variable (effective democracy) and an individual-level

Table 1. Summary statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. dev.</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual-level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social tolerance</td>
<td>0.580</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social tolerance (visible outgroups)</td>
<td>0.829</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social tolerance (less visible outgroups)</td>
<td>0.456</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian predisposition</td>
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<td>1.024</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>4.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>16.529</td>
<td>15.000</td>
<td>98.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>1.472</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>6.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<td>Ideology</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
<td>10.000</td>
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<td>Religiosity</td>
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<td>0.833</td>
<td>−2.999</td>
<td>1.100</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Country-level</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective democracy</td>
<td>4.817</td>
<td>2.961</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>9.760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
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<td>1.268</td>
<td>−0.457</td>
<td>4.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social heterogeneity</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
dependent variable (social tolerance) and, further, requires an interaction between a country-level factor (again, effective democracy) and an individual-level factor (authoritarian predisposition). Due to the clustered character of the data, the use of a multilevel model also avoids false inflation of the significance levels of the macro-level coefficient estimates that would plague the results in a simple pooled regression analysis.52

Our model can be formally illustrated as follows:

\[ y_{ij} = \alpha_j + x_{ij}\beta + \epsilon_{ij}, \quad \text{where} \quad \alpha_j = \gamma_j\Psi + \zeta_j. \]

Individual (i) tolerance levels in a given country (j) are denoted as \( y_{ij} \). The individual-level covariates are contained in \( x_{ij} \) and the country-level covariates are contained in \( \gamma_j \). The vector \( \beta \) contains the coefficients associated with \( x_{ij} \), and the vector \( \Psi \) contains the coefficients associated with \( \gamma_j \). The intercepts are captured with \( \alpha_j \), and vary by country, and the \( \zeta_j \) term captures variation around these intercepts. The random error for each individual is represented with the \( \epsilon_{ij} \) term. The estimation of this equation provides a measure of \( \rho = \text{var}(\zeta)/[\text{var}(\zeta) + \text{var}(\epsilon)] \), or the proportion of unmodelled individually held tolerance due to unobserved country-level effects.

We first re-examine the bivariate relationship between democracy and tolerance in the multilevel setting. Model 1 of Table 2 displays the results. Again, results indicate that tolerance tends to increase with the level of effective democracy. On average, a one-unit increase on our 0 to 10 effective democracy variable corresponds to about a 0.028 unit increase in one’s level of tolerance, or about 3% of the scale. A standard deviation increase in effective democracy corresponds to about a 0.083 unit increase in one’s social tolerance level.
In Model 2 we examine whether this bivariate relationship holds with the introduction of control variables and the authoritarian predisposition measure. As is reported in Table 2, the relationship between effective democracy and tolerance maintains significance. This lends credence to our first hypothesis, that of pluralistic conditioning; an increase in pluralism in a country corresponds to an increase in individual social tolerance.

To test our second hypothesis, that the negative relationship between authoritarian predisposition and tolerance is magnified in pluralist, democratic societies – aversive pluralistic conditioning – we include an interaction between effective democracy and authoritarian predisposition in Model 3. In this model, the effective democracy variable becomes a conditioning variable; we expect that the negative effect of an authoritarian predisposition on tolerance will increase in size along with the level of democracy.

Our hypothesis predicts a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term, as is reported in Table 2. Note that the coefficients on constitutive variables in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
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<tr>
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Model statistics

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</table>

Note: p-values are two-sided.
interaction terms (and their associated significance levels) should generally not be interpreted, and the absolute size of the coefficient on the interaction term must be interpreted relative to the range of the interacted variables. Thus, to fully display the conditional relationship between authoritarian predisposition and tolerance, we graph this relationship across the range of the effective democracy variable in Figure 4.53

As illustrated in Figure 4, the analysis conforms to our expectation. The negative relationship between authoritarian predisposition and tolerance increases in strength at a remarkable rate as the level of effective democracy increases. In non-democratic and less democratic regimes there is a negative relationship between an authoritarian predisposition and tolerance, but it is relatively small in magnitude. In more pluralistic democracies, this relationship is considerably stronger. For example, when the effective democracy measure equals 1.42 (Albania’s level), the coefficient on authoritarian predisposition is about -0.003. This indicates that a unit increase in the authoritarian predisposition measure corresponds to a decrease of less than 1% of the range of the tolerance scale. When the level of effective democracy is 8.70 (Austria’s level), the coefficient on authoritarian predisposition is roughly -0.023, or 2.3% of the range of the tolerance scale, a much more pronounced effect. In line with our hypotheses, the results demonstrate that higher

![Graph showing the effect of authoritarian predispositions on social tolerance as the level of democracy changes.](image)

Figure 4. The effect of authoritarian predispositions on social tolerance as the level of democracy changes.
levels of democracy promote tolerance among the public in general, but promote relative intolerance among authoritarians.

While Figure 4 demonstrates a significant and substantive difference in the effect of an authoritarian predisposition on social tolerance as effective democracy increases, this figure does not demonstrate whether authoritarians at high levels of effective democracy are more or less tolerant than those at low levels of effective democracy. In Figure 5 we plot the relationship between effective democracy and social tolerance (controlling for all other variables in Model 2) for two groups: those who score the highest on the authoritarian predisposition measure (authoritarians) and those who score lowest on the authoritarian predisposition measure (libertarians).

Figure 5 demonstrates that although the negative impact of authoritarian predisposition on social tolerance does increase along with effective democracy (as illustrated in Figure 4), social tolerance on the whole among authoritarians is higher where democracy is more effective. Yet, the slope of the increase in tolerance vis-à-vis effective democracy among authoritarians is flatter than the line for libertarians, which results in an increasing gap between authoritarians and libertarians. Higher levels of effective democracy correspond to lower levels of tolerance among authoritarians relative to libertarians, but to higher levels of tolerance in authoritarians in the absolute.

With the exception of gender, each of the individual-level control variables attains statistical significance across the models. Older cohorts, those who identify with right-wing ideology, and those with a religious disposition tend toward lower levels of tolerance, while those with more education are more tolerant. Neither of the country-level control variables reaches statistical significance.

![Figure 5. The effect of effective democracy on social tolerance for authoritarians and libertarians.](image-url)
As mentioned above, an exploratory factor analysis indicated that our social tolerance scale is composed of two separate, yet correlated, groups: the first being composed of people of a different race and immigrants/foreign workers and the second being composed of people with AIDS, homosexuals, drug users and heavy drinkers. As the social tolerance literature does not generally focus on the latter groups and emphasizes the former, to demonstrate the robustness of our findings, we present results for two separate social tolerance scales. The first is composed of the questions focusing on race and immigration, which we call ‘visible outgroups’. The second is composed of the questions related to AIDS, homosexuals, drug users and heavy drinkers, which we call ‘less visible outgroups’. The former scale has an alpha coefficient of 0.65 and the latter an alpha of 0.68.

Results, given in Tables 3 and 4, demonstrate that support for our hypotheses is also realized with the use of these less inclusive scales. That is, while tolerance, as represented by each scale, is higher where effective democracy is higher, higher levels of effective democracy also correspond with a stronger negative relationship

<table>
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<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Model 2 Coef.</th>
<th>p-value</th>
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</table>

Note: \( p \)-values are two-sided.
between authoritarianism and social tolerance. There is one interesting pattern realized in the control variables worth mentioning – it appears that while religiosity correlates negatively with tolerance toward less visible outgroups such as drug users and homosexuals, it relates positively to tolerance of other races and immigrants. Patterns are similar in further multilevel logit analyses of expressed tolerance toward each individual group. These analyses are not shown in the interest of space (a total of 18 new models), but are available from the authors upon request.

Conclusion

The theory of pluralistic conditioning states that when exposed to diversity in the absence of aversive conditions, an individual will become more tolerant of outgroups. This same thesis also predicts that when exposed to diversity in the presence of aversive conditions, an individual will become less tolerant of diversity in society.
To test the pluralistic conditioning thesis, we look to an encompassing measure of pluralism: a country’s level of effective democracy. As countries move from autocracy toward a fully effective democracy where liberal democratic principles are most completely translated from the abstract into concrete practice, they become increasingly pluralistic. The diversity inherent in pluralistic societies classically conditions members of those societies to accept diversity when exposure is under neutral or positive conditions. Under aversive conditions, however, exposure to diversity propagates intolerance toward outgroups.

The analyses in this article assume that populations largely exist in relatively neutral or positive environments and therefore that exposure to the diversity inherent to effective democracy will increase individual tolerance toward outgroups. On the other hand, for individuals with an authoritarian predisposition, individuals who are inherently averse to heterogeneity, exposure to the diversity inherent to effective democracy will automatically occur under aversive conditions and thereby will promote relative intolerance. The analyses in this article reveal that while effective democracy is positively related to social tolerance for the population at large, the experience of effective democracy also exacerbates the negative relationship between authoritarianism and social tolerance. This provides support for the pluralistic conditioning thesis.

The pluralistic conditioning thesis is a simple explanation relating effective democracy to increased individual tolerance. Unlike democratic learning theses, which require cognitive processing and acceptance of liberal democratic norms favourable to politically tolerant attitudes, pluralistic conditioning requires neither cognitive processing nor even awareness. Instead, pluralistic conditioning simply allows one to become accustomed to the diversity manifest in modern democracies and thereby become less averse to such; or, if exposed to that diversity under aversive conditions, to become conditioned to be more averse to such.

Our findings are consistent with the pluralistic conditioning thesis proposed in this article. However, the evidence is far from conclusive and further research is clearly necessary. The evidence marshalled here comes from numerous countries and while we have employed numerous control variables and multilevel models in order to make inferences across countries credible, it is still possible that some unconsidered factor is driving our findings, making the relationships we have uncovered spurious. There is less danger of this with time series analyses, which would allow for the capture of dynamic trends within countries. Time series analyses would also provide evidence regarding whether the relationship between effective democracy and tolerance is causal. We avoided strong causal language in this article due to this shortcoming in the data, instead framing our arguments in associational terms; it is certainly possible that higher levels of tolerance lead countries to adopt more liberal democratic reforms. Unfortunately, there is currently no existing data source that includes the questions necessary to measure authoritarian predisposition and social tolerance and provides the temporal variation necessary to address our theorized causal relationships. Our
expectation is that, much like the relationships uncovered in this cross-national examination, as a country becomes more ‘effectively democratic’, the gap in tolerance levels among authoritarians and non-authoritarians will widen, while tolerance levels will rise on the whole.

Decades of psychological research indicate that there are a host of forces at work shaping individuals’ thoughts and actions. Classical conditioning, operant conditioning, social learning, as well as other forces, all appear to play a part. Our intent in writing this article is not to propose that pluralistic conditioning is the sole explanation for an individual’s level of tolerance. This would ignore common sense as well as previous research. There is ample evidence that cognition and emotion can either reinforce each other or push attitudes in opposite directions – a combination of democratic learning (cognition) and pluralistic conditioning (emotion) provides an apt explanation for Figure 5.

As with much of the research on democracy and tolerance, though, the overall finding of this research is that liberal democracy and tolerance are closely and positively related. Even for those individuals who feel threatened by pluralism and the expression of diversity and who are likely to be relatively less comfortable in free and open democratic societies, liberal democracy nevertheless appears to relate closely to tolerant attitudes towards outgroups. Thus, a more liberal democratic world equates with a more tolerant world, meaning deepening democracy is a worthy pursuit due not only to proximate benefits, such as political rights and civil liberties, but also because of the indirect benefit of a tolerant populace.

Notes
1. Sartori, ‘Understanding Pluralism’.
3. Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy.
5. Peffley and Rohrschneider, ‘Democratization and Political Tolerance’.
9. Dunn, Orellana and Singh, ‘Legislative Diversity and Social Tolerance’.
12. Ibid., 227.
15. Wilson, ‘Feeling More Than We Can Know’.
17. Pettigrew, ‘Intergroup Contact Theory’.
20. Pettigrew and Tropp, ‘How Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice?’.
27. See also Feldman and Stenner, ‘Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism’; Stenner, *The Authoritarian Dynamic*.
28. We use the term ‘countries’ for simplicity, but note that not all polities surveyed are sovereign entities. These include Northern Ireland, East and West Germany, and arguably Taiwan.
32. Hurwitz and Mondak, ‘Democratic Principles’.
33. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*.
34. Welzel, ‘Effective Democracy, Mass Culture, and the Quality of Elites’.
37. Ibid., 747; Martin, *The Tolerant Personality*.
42. For more nuanced item batteries such as the child-rearing questions used in the American National Election Studies (for example, Hetherington and Suhay, ‘Authoritarianism, Threat’; Stenner, *The Authoritarian Dynamic*), alphas are indeed higher, though still less than ideal. A high alpha, in any case, does not necessarily indicate that component items are tapping a consistent, homogenous, unidimensional construct, rather it is simply indicating that such responses ‘hang together’ (cf., Cronbach and Shavelson, ‘My Current Thoughts on Coefficient Alpha and Successor Procedures’; Green and Yang, ‘Commentary on Coefficient Alpha’; Revelle and Zinbarg, ‘Coefficients Alpha, Beta, Omega, and the GLB’; Sijtsma, ‘Reliability Beyond Theory and Into
Practice’). For example, Altemeyer’s right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale possesses a notoriously high alpha (Altemeyer, *The Authoritarian Specter*; Altemeyer, *Enemies of Freedom*; Altemeyer, *Right-wing Authoritarianism*), yet it is empirically demonstrated that a three-dimensional solution fits better than a one-dimensional solution (Funke, ‘The Dimensionality of Right-wing Authoritarianism’).

43. Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*.

44. Davis, ‘Communism, Conformity, Cohorts, and Categories’; McCutcheon, ‘A Latent Class Analysis of Tolerance’; for example, Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*.


51. Alesina et al., ‘Fractionalization’.

52. Steenbergen and Jones, ‘Modeling Multilevel Data Structures’.

53. Figures 4 and 5 were created with the help of code provided as an accompaniment to work by Brambor et al. (Brambor, Clark and Golder, ‘Understanding Interaction Models’).


Notes on contributors

Kris Dunn is an honorary university fellow at the University of Exeter. His research examines how social and political context interact with individual (pre)dispositions to influence attitudes, behavior, and identity. He has recently published research in *Electoral Studies* and *Political Studies*.

Shane P. Singh is an assistant professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia. His research focuses on the institutional and contextual foundations of political behavior and attitudes. He has recently published research in *Political Research Quarterly*, *Political Behavior*, *Political Studies*, and *Electoral Studies*.

Bibliography


